Abstract. Based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (BIDHP), we first propose a provably secure probabilistic signature scheme. Furthermore, we extend it into two universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes under the same computational assumption. The first one is a conventional UDVS scheme for one designated verifier while the other is designed for cooperative multi-verifier. UDVS schemes aim at protecting the privacy of signature holders and have practical benefits to the applications, e.g., the certificate for medical records and income summary, etc. The comparison results demonstrate that the signature generation and designation of our scheme are both pairing-free, which could benefit the application of devices with constrained computation. We also give formal security proofs of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model.
Introduction
In the digitalized world, digital signature schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] are commonly applied mechanisms, which can be used to ensure the integrity, the authenticity [6] and the non-repudiation [7] . To be precise, any third party can first acquire the signer's public key and then verify the corresponding signatures. Since only the one who owns the private key can create a valid signature, the signer cannot repudiate his generated signatures later. There are usually two types of digital signature schemes, i.e., deterministic [1] and probabilistic [6] . A deterministic signature scheme has the unique signature for the same message while a probabilistic one always generates different signatures for an identical message.
Consider the privacy issue in some special applications such as the electronic voting [8, 9] . It is not desired for anyone to verify the resulting signature. To realize the notion, in 1990, Chaum and Antwerpen [10] proposed the undeniable signature scheme in which a verifier must interactively cooperate with the signer to verify generated signatures. In other words, the signer has the ability to determine which verifier is able to check the validity of his signatures. Hence the privacy requirement is fulfilled in the undeniable signature scheme.
In 1996, Jakobsson et al. [11] introduced the idea of non-interactive designated verifier proof and addressed the designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme without non-repudiation. In a DVS scheme, the signer does not have to participate in every signature verification process. When creating the DVS, the signer directly incorporates the designated verifier's public key with the signing process. A special property of the DVS scheme is that the designated verifier can use his private key to generate another valid DVS intended for himself, which is referred to as the transcript simulation. Owing to this property, the designated verifier cannot persuade any third party of the DVS's authenticity. Consequently, only the intended verifier will believe the signature's validity. Note that although the DVS is publicly verifiable with the designated verifier's public key, it is difficult for any third party to identify the actual signer and verify the authenticity for a given DVS.
In 2003, however, Wang [12] and Saeednia et al. [13] separately found out the security weakness in Jakobsson et al.'s scheme. Saeednia et al. not only gave a countermeasure, but also further proposed the strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) scheme which removes the property of public verifiability by taking the designated verifier's private key as a crucial parameter in the signature verification equality. Therefore, without the designated verifier's private key, no one can even check the validity of an SDVS. Since then, lots of researchers have devoted themselves to the study of SDVS variants [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
The universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes were introduced by Steinfeld et al. [20, 21] , in which the signer and the signature holder are different persons. Focusing on protecting the signature holders' privacy, a UDVS scheme allows any signature holder to non-interactively designate a publicly verifiable signature (PV-signature) to an intended verifier using the verifier's public key. The designated verifier can validate the UDVS with his private key, but can not transfer the conviction to any third party, which is also referred to as nontransferability. The UDVS schemes are useful in stopping the verifier from arbitrarily disseminating the signature and therefore applicable to the applications such as the certificate for medical records and income summary. In 2005, Zhang et al. [22] proposed a UDVS scheme based on the strong Diffie-Hellman problem (SDHP). In 2008, Huang et al. [23] proposed another UDVS scheme based on the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (GBDHP). Both Zhang et al.'s and Huang et al.'s schemes provide the provable security. Nevertheless, the computational costs of their schemes are rather high and many similar variants [24] [25] [26] only consider the conventional setting of single designated verifier.
Our contributions
It is known that a UDVS scheme can be extended from any general digital signature scheme, meaning that a security weakness of a digital signature will also be inherited by its UDVS extension. It is therefore crucial to construct a UDVS scheme from secure probabilistic signatures which provide randomness with respect to even identical messages. In this paper, we first propose a novel and secure probabilistic signature based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (BIDHP) and then extend it into two UDVS schemes. One is a conventional UDVS scheme allowing one intended verifier to validate the signature while the other is a universal designated multi-verifier signature (UDMVS) scheme in which all verifiers must cooperatively check the signature. Compared with previous schemes, the proposed schemes are especially suitable for computation-constrained devices, since the signature generation and designation are pairing-free. Moreover, the formal security proofs of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) are proved in the random oracle model.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some used security notions and the computational assumptions.
Bilinear Pairing
Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ×) be two groups of the same prime order q and e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 a bilinear map which satisfies the following properties: i. Bilinearity:
ii. Non-degeneracy:
If P is a generator of G 1 , then e (P, P) is a generator of G 2 .
iii. Computability:
Given P, Q ∈ G 1 , the value of e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed by a polynomial-time algorithm.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem; BDHP
The BDHP is, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G 1 for some a, b, c ∈ Z q , to compute e (P, P) abc ∈ G 2 .
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial F(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the BDHP with an advantage of at most 1/F(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance and over the random choices of A. 
Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem; BIDHP
The BIDHP is, given P, aP, bP ∈ G 1 for some a, b ∈ Z q , to compute e (P, P)
Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman (BIDH) Assumption
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial F(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the BIDHP with an advantage of at most 1/F (k), i.e.,
Probabilistic Signature Scheme based on BIDHP
In this section, we first address involved parties and composed algorithms of our proposed probabilistic signature scheme and then give a detailed construction.
Involved parties
A probabilistic signature scheme has two involved parties: a signer and a verifier. Each one is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPTM). The signer generates a publicly verifiable signature (PV-signature) such that the verifier can validate it with signer's public key.
Algorithms
The proposed scheme consists of three algorithms (including Setup, PSG and PSV). We describe these algorithms as follows:
• Setup: Taking as input 1 k where k is a security parameter, the algorithm generates the system's public parameters params.
• PV-Signature-Generation (PSG): The PSG algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a message and the private key of signer. It generates a PV-signature Ω.
• PV-Signature-Verification (PSV): The PSV algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a PV-signature Ω along with the corresponding message m, and the public key of signer. It outputs True if Ω is a valid PV-signature for m. Otherwise, the error symbol ¶ is returned as a result.
Construction of Probabilistic Signature Scheme
We detail the construction of our probabilistic signature scheme as follows:
• Setup: Taking as input 1 k , the system authority (SA) selects two groups (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ×) of the same prime order q where |q| = k. Let P be a generator of order q over G 1 , e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 a bilinear pairing and h 1 : G 1 → G 1 and h 2 : {0, 1}* × G 1 → Z q collision resistant hash functions. The system publishes the public parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, P, e, h 1 , h 2 }. Each user U i chooses his private key x i ∈ Z q and registers the public key as
• PV-Signature-Generation (PSG): Let U s be the signer. For signing a message m ∈ R {0, 1}*, U s chooses r ∈ R Z q to compute
The PV-signature for the message m is Ω = (R, T, ρ).
• PV-Signature-Verification (PSV): To check the validity of the PV-signature Ω = (R, T, ρ), anyone can verify whether
If the quality holds, the PV-signature is valid. We show that the verification of Eq. (4) 
which leads to the right-hand side of Eq. (4).
Extensions into UDVS and UDMVS schemes
In this section, we present UDVS and UDMVS schemes based on the proposed probabilistic signature scheme. We first address involved parties and composed algorithms of our UDVS/UDMVS scheme and then give concrete constructions.
Involved parties
A conventional UDVS scheme has three involved parties including a signer, a designator (signature holder) and a designated verifier. Unlike the conventional UDVS scheme, UDMVS scheme has designated multi-verifier, say, consisting of n verifiers. In our proposed UDVS and UDMVS schemes, each party is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPTM). The signer will generate a PVsignature and send it along with the message to the designator. After validating the PV-signature, the designator further creates a designated verifier/multiverifier signature (DV/DMV-signature) and deliveries it together with the message to the designated verifier/multi-verifier. Consequently, the DV/DMVsignature can only be verified by the designated verifier/multi-verifier with his/their private key(s). Besides, the designated verifier/multi-verifier can not transfer the conviction to any third party, since he/they is/are also capable of generating another computationally indistinguishable transcript.
Algorithms
The proposed UDVS/UDMVS scheme consists of five algorithms (including Setup, PSG, PSV, DSG and DSV). The first three algorithms are defined the same as those in our probabilistic signature scheme. We only describe others as follows:
• DV-Signature-Generation (DSG): The DSG algorithm takes as input a PV-signature Ω along with the corresponding message m, and the public key of designated verifier. It generates a DVsignature δ.
• DV-Signature-Verification (DSV): The DSV algorithm takes as input a DV-signature δ along with the corresponding message m, the private key of the designated verifier, and the public key of signer. It outputs True if δ is a valid DV-signature for m. Otherwise, the error symbol ¶ is returned as a result.
• DMV-Signature-Generation (DMSG): The DMSG algorithm takes as input a PV-signature Ω along with the corresponding message m, and the public keys of designated multi-verifier. It generates a DMV-signature δ.
• DMV-Signature-Verification (DMSV): The DMSV algorithm takes as input a DMV-signature δ along with the corresponding message m, the private keys of the designated multi-verifier, and the public key of signer. It outputs True if δ is a valid DMV-signature for m. Otherwise, the symbol is returned as a result.
Concrete construction of UDVS scheme
We demonstrate the proposed UDVS scheme in the subsection. This scheme is a conventional UDVS which only allows the signature holder to solely designate the PV-signature to one intended designated verifier without further interactions. For simplicity, we only detail phases of DSG and DSV below:
• DV-Signature-Generation (DSG): Let U v be the designated verifier with public key Y v . To create a DV-signature for a given message m and its PVsignature Ω = (R, T, ρ), the designator computes
and then deliveries the DV-signature δ = (R, T, W) along with the corresponding message m to U v .
• DV-Signature-Verification (DSV): Upon receiving (δ, m), U v verifies whether
If the quality holds, the DV-signature is valid. We show that the verification of Eq. (6) works correctly. From the left-hand side of Eq. (6), we have
which leads to the right-hand side of Eq. (6).
Concrete construction of UDMVS scheme
We introduce the proposed UDMVS scheme in the subsection. In this scheme, all designated verifiers must cooperatively check the validity of received DMV-signature. Since the algorithms of Setup, PSG and PSV are the same to the above, we only describe the others below:
• DMV-Signature-Generation (DMSG): Without lost of generality, let V = {U v 1 , U v 2 , …, U v n } be the group composed of n designated verifiers. To create a DMV-signature for a given message m and its PV-signature Ω = (R, T, ρ), the designator first chooses k ∈ R Z p to compute
and then deliveries the DMV-signature δ = (R, T, W, K) along with the corresponding message m to V.
and then sends it to a clerk U ck ∈V. After collecting all Z j 's, U ck verifies whether 
(by Eq. (7)) )) ( , ) , ( ( 
Security proof and comparison
In this section, we first define the essential security model and then prove the security of our proposed schemes. Some comparisons with related schemes are also made.
Security Model
A common security requirement of the proposed probabilistic signature scheme and its UDVS/UDMVS extensions is unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA). According to [19] , it is sufficient to prove the unforgeability of DV/DMV-signature, since the property of PV-unforgeability is implied by it. As for a secure UDVS/UDMVS scheme, we have to further consider the security requirement of nontransferability, i.e., the designated verifier/multiverifier cannot transfer the conviction to any third party. We define these security notions as Definitions 3 and 4.
Definition 3. (Strong DV/DMV-Unforgeability) A DV/DMV-signature of the UDVS/UDMVS scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with a non-negligible advantage in the following game played with a challenger B:
Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm and sends the system's public parameters params to the adversary A.
Phase 1: The adversary A can issue several kinds of queries adaptively, i.e., each query might be based on the result of previous queries:
• PV-Signature-Generation (PSG) queries: A makes a PSG query for a message m. B returns the corresponding PV-signature Ω.
• DV/DMV-Signature-Verification (DSV/DMSV) queries: A makes a DSV/DMSV query for a pair (δ, m) with respect to the signer and the designated verifier/multi-verifier. B returns True if δ is a valid DV/DMV-signature for m. Otherwise, the error symbol ¶ is returned as a result. 
Definition 4. (Non-Transferability) A UDVS/UDMVS scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of non-transferability if the designated verifier/multi-verifier can simulate a computationally indistinguishable transcript intended for him/them with his/their private key(s).

Security proof
We prove that the proposed scheme achieves the above defined security models as Theorems 1 to 4. 
Theorem 1. (Strong DV-Unforgeability)
Here t λ is the time for performing one bilinear pairing computation. • PSG queries: When A makes a PSG query for ). The running time required for B is t' ≈ t + t λ (2q DMSV ).
Proof. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3. (Non-Transferability)
The proposed UDVS scheme satisfies the security requirement of non-transferability.
Proof:
To generate a DV-signature δ* intended for himself, any designated verifier first chooses R* ∈ R G 1 and f ∈ R Z q to compute
Here, δ* = (R*, T*, W*) is a valid DV-signature for m. The generated δ* is computationally indistinguishable from the received δ. To be precise, the probability that the computed δ* = (R*, T*, W*) and the received δ = (R, T, W) are identical is at most Proof: To generate another DMV-signature δ* intended for the group V, the clerk U ck first chooses R*, K* ∈ R G 1 and then delivers K* to each U v i ∈V.
and then sends it back to U ck . After receiving all Z j *'s, U ck chooses f ∈ R Z q and further computes
Here, δ* = (R*, T*, W*, K*) is a valid DMVsignature for m. The generated δ* is computationally indistinguishable from the received δ. To be precise, the probability that the computed δ* = (R*, T*, W*, K*) and the received δ = (R, T, W, K) are identical is at most 2
Comparisons
In this subsection, we compare the proposed schemes with some related ones including Steinfeld et al.'s (St-DV for short) [20] , the LaguillaumieVergnaud (La-DV for short) [28] and Ng et al.'s (Ng-DMV for short) [29] schemes in terms of signature type, security assumption and computational efficiency. For convenience, we only evaluate the most time-consuming operations, i.e., the bilinear pairing computation in the following comparisons. Other operations can be ignored, since they are negligible as compared with it. Let T B be the time for performing one bilinear pairing. The detailed evaluation is demonstrated as Table 1 . From the table, it can be seen that the proposed schemes are pairingfree in PSG and DSG/DMSG phases, which benefits to the computation limited devices. Most importantly, the proposed schemes are probabilistic, which means that our schemes have different signatures for the identical message. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a novel and provably secure probabilistic signature scheme and its extensions into UDVS and UDMVS schemes. In a UDVS/UDMVS scheme, the designated verifier/multi-verifier can only check the validity of a DV/DMV-signature, but can not transfer the conviction to any third party, so as to protect the privacy of any signature holder. The underlining security of our proposed signature scheme and its extensions is based on the bilinear inverse DiffieHellman problem (BIDHP) which is polynomial-time equivalent to the well-known bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP). Compared with previous works, our schemes have crucial benefits to computation constrained devices, as the PV-signature generation and designation are pairing-free. Moreover, we also proved that the proposed schemes achieve the security requirement of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model.
